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SUPPLEMENT TO POOL MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell October 30, 1986 
From: Ronald 
No. 86-341, Ft. Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne 
The able memo-writer recommends a note. Although the 
questions are substantial.' I recommend e 
ERISA: It seems to me that a state statute requiring 
payment of severance pay does not necessarily create a "benefit 
' · 
plan" within the meaning of ERISA. No other 6ourt has dealt with 
..----- -----~
this precise situation. . The result s~E!ms probably correct, 
though there certainly is some tension with the statutory text. 
The word "plan" must have some content. A flat requirement that 
I 
2. 
employers pay lump-sum severance pay does not seem to raise the 
questions that motivated passage of ERISA in the first place. 
Thus, I agree with the court below. 
NLRA: I think the NLRA contention is meritless. Surely 
a requirement that employers pay severance pay is one of "the 
myriad of state laws [in existence when the NLRA was passed] that 
set minimum labor standards, but were unrelated in any way to the 
processes of bargaining or self-organization." Metropolitan 
Life, 105 s. Ct., at 2398. I do not understand how this require-
ment has any effect on collective bargaining. It simply removes 
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No. 86-341 
FT. HALIFAX PACKING CO., INC. 
(employer) 
v. 
COYNE, DIRECTOR, ETC. (Dir. State/Civ. 
of State Bur. Labor Standards 
& employees granted severance pay) 
Roberts, 
Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appnt challenges, under the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 197 and the National 
Labor Relations Act ( "NLRA") ,. the award of severance pay under 
state law to former employees. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Appnt began packaging and 
processing poultry in Winslow, Maine in 1972. On May 23, 1981, 
appnt ceased processing operations at the Winslow plant and layed 
off most of its workforce. At the time of closing, appnt had 
~ over 100 individuals on the payroll. Many of the employees were 
DFW S\=Q (<;~ ~uM~~)~ 
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represented by Local 385 of the Amalgamated Meatcutters and 
Butcher Workmen of North America {"Local 385") and had a contract 
with appnt. This contract had effective dates from June 2, 1979 ~11~ 
to June 2, 1982 and contained no provision for severance pay. At -- ----r 
the time of closing, appnt had no contract or agreement regarding 
severance pay that governed any of the layed-off employees. In 
the fall of 1981, appnt, believing that reopening was possible, 
sought concessions from Local 385 in the form of amendments to 
the union contract. The amendments, inter alia, sought to add a 
severance pay provision to the contract that would shield appnt 
from severance pay liability for union members under 26 Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §625-B 1 in the event the plant reopened. Although 
Local 385 signed the agreement on Nov. 1, 1981, appnt never 
lsec · provides in part: 
"2. Severance Pay. Any employer who relocates or 
1nates a covered establishment shall be liable to 
his employees for severance pay at the rate of one 
week's pay for each year of employment by the employee 
in that establishment. The severance pay to eligible 
employees shall be in addition to any final wage 
payment to the employee and shall be paid within one 
regular pay period after the employee's last full day 
of work, notwithstanding any other provisions of law. 
"3. Mitigation of Severance Pay Liability. There 
shall be no liability for severance pay to an eligible 
individual if: 
A. Relocation or termination of a covered 
establishment is necessitated by a physical calamity; 
B. The employee is covered by an express contract 
providing for severance pay; 
C. That employee accepts employment at the new 
location; or 
D. That employee has been employed by the employer 
for less than three years." 
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resumed operations before the expiration date of the proposed 
amendments, June 2, 1984. Prior to the signing of the 
amendments, employees of the plant, appees in this action, filed 
suit against appnt, seeking severance pay pursuant to §625-B. A --------------. 
few days later, appee, Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, 
also commenced an action to enforce the provisions of Maine 
severance pay law as to all of appnt's employees. After a 
consolidated trial, the trial justice found that appnt was liable 
for severence pay . With respect to the issues relevant here, the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 
The ~ne Sup. Jud. first rejected appnt's argument that 
it was not 1a e for severance pay under §625-B because that 
statute is preempted by ERISA. The court first noted that ERISA 
t . J;l t. . . \\ h . d con a1ns an express preemp 1on prov1s1on t at prov1 es: 
"Except as provided in subsection (6) of this 
section, the prov1s1ons of this title and title IV 
shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they 
may~reafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan described in §1003(a) of this title." 29 u.s.c. 
§1144. 
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 u.s. 85 (1983), the Court held 
that §1144 not only preempts state law governing the subject 
matters covered by ERISA, but also state law that has "a 
connection with or reference to" employee benefit plans covered 
by the statute. Id., at 97-98. Because Maine's severance pay 
----- -·-
law does not attempt to regulate the reporting, disclosure, and 
fiduciary subjects covered by ERISA, the statute will be 
preempted only if it can be said to have "a connection with or 
reference to" employee benefit plans that are within ERISA' s 
coverage. The Maine severance pay statute does not affect 
~-
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employee benefit plans that are within ERISA's regulatory reach. 
It is clear under 29 u.s.c. §§1003(a) and 1002(1) that the 
employee benefit plans intended for coverage under ERISA are 
those created by employers or employee organizations. Thus, the 
preemptive effect of §1144 is on those state laws that affect 
plans created by either of these private parties. The severance 
pay liability here is a state-created fringe benefit. In 
addition, §625-B (b) (B) totally eliminates state regulation if a 
plan covering severance pay is created by an employer or employee 
organization. Because Maine's severance pay statute is 
operative only when a privately created employee benefit plan 
covering severance pay is not in existence, it does not have a 
"connection with or reference to" an employee benefit plan 
covered by ERISA. 
The Maine Sup. Jud. Ct. next rejected appnt' s argument that 
§625-B is preempted by the NLRA. Appnt had argued that, because 
the Maine severance pay statute mandates the substantive terms of 
its collective bargaining agreement, the statute is preempted. 
The court disagreed, noting that this Court has discerned two 
different principles of preemption that flow from the NLRA. The 
first principle is based on implied congressional intent to leave 
certain conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited by 
either §7 or §8 of the NLRA unrestricted from most forms of 
regulation by either the NLRB or the States. Despite the 
seemingly broad range of this branch of the NLRA preempt ion, 
state laws of general application that impose minimal substantive 
requirements on contract terms are not preempted. See 
- 5 -
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct. 2380 
(1985). Maine's severance pay law is a statute of general 
application that affects union and nonunion employees equally. 
The statute has a very limited impact on the collective 
bargaining process because it does not ever apply when the 
parties have reached an agreement on the subject of severance 
pay. Although §625-B does affect the collective bargaining 
relationship by encouraging employers to either agree to some 
form of severance pay contract or face liability under the 
section, it does not limit the rights of self organization or 
forms of collective bargaining protected by the NLRA. The second 
line of preemption that can be discerned from Sup. Ct. cases 
protects the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB to determine what 
kind of conduct is either prohibited or protected by the NLRA. 
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 u.s. 236 (1959). 
State statutes that have been held to be preempted under Garmon 
involve state action that attempts to regulate conduct directly 
that is protected under §7 of the NLRA or prohibited under §8 of 
the Act. Appnt contended that the Maine severance pay law 
regulates conduct protected by the NLRB by (1) imposing a 
different resolution to a bargaining impasse that is required by 
§8(d) of the NLRA and (2) interfering with the employer's right 
under §7 of the NLRA to implement its last best offer 
unilaterally. This argument, however, merely asserts that Maine 
may not employ its police power to enact a law of general 
application that has an effect on the collective bargaining 
process. This does not even implicate Garmon-type preemption. 
- 6 -
Moreover, even if §625-B does interfere with the jurisdiction of 
the NLRB, the statute would be saved from preemption under Farmer 
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 430 
U.S. 2 90 (1977) , because it reflects the State's substantial 
interest in protecting Maine citizens from the economic 
} 
dislocation that accom~es large-scale plant closings. 
3. CONTENTIONS: ERISA preemption: Appnt first observes 
that severance pay plans are employee welfare benefit plans 
within the definition of that term in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
§1002 (1) (B). The Maine severance pay statute requires that an 
employer have a severance pay plan. The statute provides the 
employer with two options: (1) accepting the statutory terms and 
conditions of that plan or (2) selecting other terms and 
conditions. Either option results in the creation of a severance 
pay plan. Since the very operation of §625-B requires an 
employer to establish a plan, the statute has "connection with or 
reference to" an employee benefit plan and is preempted by ERISA. 
Shaw, supra, 463 u.s., at 96-97. The Maine Sup. Jud. Ct.'s 
decision is in conflict with that of the CA9 in Standard Oil Co. 
of California v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (CA9 1980), aff'd mem., 
4 54 U.S. 801 ( 1981) • In Standard Oil, the plaintiff challenged 
the state law requiring employers to provide a comprehensive pre-
paid health plan to their employees. The State of Hawaii argued 
that the terms "employee benefit plan" in ERISA did not encompass 
plans mandated by state law. The CA9 rejected this argument. 
The Agsalud decision finds its support in the plain language of 
ERISA. Section 1003 (b) (3) exempts from ERISA coverage a "plan 
- 7 -
maintained solely for the purpose of complying with [i] 
applicable workmen's compensation laws or [ii] unemployment 
compensation [laws] or [iii] disability insurance laws." These 
are the only exemptions for state-mandated employee benefits. If 
Congress had intended the sweeping exemption found by the Maine 
court, the specific exemptions in §1003(b) (3) would be 
superfluous. 
Appees argue that the Maine severance pay law is not 
preempted under ERISA because (1) the law is not a private 
employee benefit plan established by an employer or union, and 
(2) the law does not create an ongoing program of benefits but 
instead 
shutdown. 
imposes a one-time obligation in the event of a plant 
The theory advanced by appnt would lead to highly 
anomalous results. If, as appnt suggests, the severance pay law 
must be deemed to require employers to maintain an ERISA covered 
plan, then it would be preempted even with respect to those 
employers who have no pens ion plan or employee benefit plan of 
any kind. Thus, an employer that has no ERISA plan and is 
therefore not subject to regulation under ERISA would 
nevertheless be able to take advantage of ERISA preemption to 
escape its obligations under the Maine severance pay law. The 
CA9 's decision in Agsalud is distinguishable for two reasons. 
First, the Hawaii statute at issue in Agsalud required employers 
to establish an ongoing benefit program. Second, the Hawaii 
statute imposed certain specific additional requirements on the 
employer's existing ERISA plan. In the case at bar, however, the 
Maine severance pay law does not in any way alter the rights or 
- 8 -
obligations of appnt under its existing pension plan. 
In its brief in opposition to appees motion to dismiss or 
affirm, appnt refutes appees attempt to distinguish Agsalid. As 
held in Holland v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 
(CA4 1985), aff'd mem. sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Industries, 
Inc., 106 s. Ct. (1986), and Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 
Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (CA2 1985), aff'd mem., 106 s. Ct. 3267 
(1986) , severence pay plans are ERISA plans, even though they 
typically involve one-time, lump-sum payments. 
The United States Chamber of Commerce, as amicus curiae, has 
submitted a brief in support of appnt. The Chamber of Commerce 
submits that the decision of the Maine Sup. Jud. Ct. is in 
conflict with the decisions in Holland, supra, and Gilbert, 
supra. 
NLRA preemption: Appnt maintains that severance pay is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. See NLRB v. Royal Plating & 
Polishing Co., 350 F. 2d 191 (CA3 1965). Nevertheless, the NLRA 
provides that a bargaining "obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal." See §8(d), 29 u.s.c. §l58(d}. In 
__/"" 
construing §8 (d) , this Court has stated that Congress intended 
employers and unions to negotiate in a generally unregulated 
atmosphere. See, e.g., Lodge 76, International Association of 
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 u.s. 
132 (1976) 0 The Maine statute intrudes on the bargaining 
'---------------~-----------------------
process. Moreover, the Maine statute sets up a standard that 
non-union employers can avoid easily and that unions can bargain 
away if they extract a satisfactory guid pro guo. The Maine 
. ... 
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statute interferes in an area where the States maintain little, 
if any, regulatory authority. 
Appees respond that appnt' s NLRA preemption argument is 
foreclosed by the decision in Metropolitan Life, supra. The 
Maine severance pay law merely requires that individual workers 
be given a specific benefit under certain circumstances. As a 
result, it falls within the category of state legislation 
establishing "minimum labor standards" as that term is used in 
Metropolitan Life. Since the Maine severance pay law does not 
regulate or interfere with any of the economic weapons that 
Congress has left to employers and employees, it is not 
preempted. In fact, the Maine severance pay law is significantly 
less intrusive than the Massachusetts mandatory benefit law 
upheld in Metropolitan Life because it preserves the freedom of 
employers and employees to contract on the subject of severance 
pay. 
In reply, appant concedes t~ the dispute over NLRA 
preemption is governed by the proper interpretation of ---Metropolitan Life. The fundamental distinction between this case 
and Metropolitan Life is that the Maine statute does not 
ish a minimum standard. Maine employers may contract to 
benefit provided by the statute. 
The Chamber of Commerce essentially repeats the arguments of 
appnt. . ----........._ 
/ ') 
4 (' ,orscu~
ERIS-A- Preemption: This Court's decision in Shaw, supra, does 
not provide a def ini ti ve answer to the issue here because Shaw 
- 10 -
concerned state law requirements governing employee benefit plans ~ 
established by employers. The decisions in Holland, supra, and~ 
I 
Gilbert, supra, concerned severance pay provisions in employee 
handbooks prepared by the employer in both cases. Because the 
a state statutory reguirement, these cases do not conflict with 
... --- - ...,..-_--
the decision below. The CA9's decision in Agsalid, supra, 
~--- --·-· 
however, presents a closer question. Appee correctly notes that 
the prepaid health care plans required by Hawaii law in Agsalid 
were ongoing plans that supplemented health care plans governed 
by ERISA. Despite these differences with the case at hand, the 
CA9's rejection of the argument that the term "employee benefit 
plans" under ERISA does not encompass requirements imposed by 
state law does conflict with the Maine Sup. Jud. Ct.'s treatment 
of the same argument. Because this issue is likely to arise in 
other ... contex-~nary review may be warranted. 
f NLRA Preemption ~ The preemptive effect of the NLRA on the 
Maine ~tatute her ;:;~~nder Metropolitan Life, supra. In 
Metropolitan Life, this Court stated that "there is no 
suggestion in the legislative history of the NLRA that Congress 
intended to disturb the myriad of state laws then in existence 
that set minimum labor standards, but were unrelated in any way 




At first glance, the Maine severance pay statute 
fall ~ of "minimum labor standards" 
preemptive scope of the NLRA. Nevertheless, the 
. ,• 
Metropolitan Life Court described a "minimum labor standard" as a 
,. 
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requirement that {1) affects "union and nonunion employees 
equally," { 2) neither encourages nor discourages the 
"collective-bargaining processes," and {3) is "independent of the 
collective-bargaining process." Id., at 2397. Because the 
severance pay provision in the Maine statute is not applicable if 
an employee is covered by an express contract providing for 
severance pay, a union can use the statutory requirement as a 
bargaining chip in contract negotiations to exact concessions 
from an employer. As such, appn t may be correct in asserting 
that the Maine statute is not sufficiently independent of the 
collective bargaining process to constitute a labor standard 
outside the reach of the NLRA. Moreover, as appnt argues, the 
Maine statute does not establish a minimum standard because the 
statutory standard 
preemption question 
may be lowered by contract. 
is therefore suff icently close 
against summary action. 
I recommend noting probable jurisdiction. 
The NLRA 1 
to counsel 
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm, a brief in a 
opposition to the motion to dismiss or affirm, and a brief by the 
United States Chamber of Commerce as amicus curiae. 
October 29, 1986 Little opn in petn 
November 7, 1986 
Court .................................. . Voted on .............................. , 19 ... . .. 
Argued ................................ , 19 ..... . Assigned ............................. , 19 .... .. No. 86-341 
Submitted ............................ , 19 .... .. Announced .......................... , 19 .... .. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Justice Powell February 17, 1987 
From: Ronald 
No. 86-341, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne 
Appeal from Maine Supreme Court 
Set for oral argument Tuesday March 24 (2d case) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: Whether a Maine statute that requires em-
ployers, in the absence of an express contract to the contrary, 
to pay severance pay upon plant closings, is preempted by ERISA 
~
or by the NLRA. 
- 2. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
26 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §625-B is the Maine Plant Clos-
ing Law. It applies to any employer who closes, or moves more 
than 100 miles, an establishment that employs more than 100 work-
ers. The statute requires such employers to pay severance pay at 
the rate of one week's pay for each year of employment. The 
statute does not apply if the e~yee "is ~ve_:ed by an e,2{press 
contract providing for severance pay." §625-B(3} (B). 
Appt Fort Halifax Packing operated a covered establish-
ment in Winslow, Maine. It closed the factory on May 23, 1981, 
but did not pay severance pay. In November, 1981, appee Director 
--- ------------of the Maine Bureau of Labor Standards (the State} sued appt 
seeking to force appt to pay severance pay under the statute. 
Appt contended that the severance pay law is preempted by ERIS~ 
and the NLRA. Both the trial court and the Maine Supreme Court 
held appt 1 iable. Maine set concluded that the statute was ,not ~. <) ( G ( 
pr~empted by ~SA because _ERISA regulates only privately created 
employee benefit plans; it does not apply to state-created obli-
gations like the severance pay statute. Maine set thought the 
NLRA claim was controlled by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 u.s. 724 (1985}. In that case, the Court held 
that the NLRA does not preempt state laws that merely mandate 
minimum employee benefits. The Maine SCT concluded that the sev-
erance pay law was such a law. 
Fort Halifax filed a jurisdictional statement. All vot-
ed to note except for JUSTICES BLACKMUN & STEVENS. The Court 
requested an amicus brief from the SG. 
3 • 
II. ERISA PREEMPTION 
Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts "any and all State laws 
---=-
~ 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee bene-
fit plan." 29 u.s. c. §1144(a). The Court has described this as 
a "virtually unique pre-emption provision." Franchise Tax Board 
v. Construction Laborers vacation Trust, 463 u.s. 1, 24, n. 26 
(1983). It is clear that Congress intended the sweep of this 
provision to be extremely broad. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 463 u.s. 85, 98-100 (1983). Thus, the C~et­
ed the provision broadly. It has not yet rejected any claim that 
a particular state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan 
within the meaning of §514(a). Accordingly, the usual presump-
tions against preemption seem inapplicable in this case; rather, ~ 
.----.....,. . 
Congress' intent, as summarized in Shaw, suggests a presumption 
in ~ion of any statute that would hinder the uni- ~ 
formity Congress sought to establish. 
The term "employee benefit plan" includes the term "em-
ployee welfare benefit plan," which is defined as "any plan, 
fund, or program which ••• is ••• established or maintained by an 
employer ••• to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was 
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing [a num-
ber of listed benefits, including] any benefit described in sec-
tion 186(c) of this title." 29 u.s.c. §1002(1). 29 u.s.c. 
§186(c) includes "money ••• paid ••• for the purpose of ••• sev-
erance . . . benefits. n §186 (c) (6). Thus, there can be no ques-
II \ '-
tion that a plan providing severance benefits would be a plan -- .-----.. 
covered by ERISA. See, e.g., Holland v. Burlington Industries, 
4. 
k 
Inc., 77 2 F. 2d 1140, 1144-1146 ( CA4 1985) (per Wilkinson, J.) , 
aff'd mem., No. 85-944, 106 s. Ct. 3267 (1986). 
1. Does the Maine statute create an ERISA plan?--The 
E icul t q ~est.!_Y!i}in this case is whether a statute requiring 
employer~~Y certain em lo ~s, but allowing employ-
ers to contract out of the obligation, "relates_ to" ~y "plan" 
within the meaning of ERISA. In this case, appt had no formal ---- -- --~ 
benefit plan in the normal sense. But appt's principal point is 
that passage of the state statute requiring appt to pay benefits 
created a plan within the meaning of ERISA. This argument has 
two difficulties. 1 k 
First, such a plan is established by the not by a 
private employer. §514(a) only covers plans "established or 
maintained by an employer." 29 u.s. C. §1002 ( 1) • Although this 
was the basis of the Maine S Ct's decision, I am not persuaded. ~~~ 
Mai~stablished" this obligation, ~t it seems fair rk ") -
to say that the employer "maintains" a program for making the 
payments. In a similar context, CA9 concluded: "Congress did 
distinguish between plans established or maintained by private 
employers for private employees and plans established or main-
tained by government entities for government employees. Such 
government plans are exempt. Private plans are not." Standard 
--------------Oil of California v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 762 (1980), aff'd 
mem. 454 u.s. 801 (1981). I think this is a credible reading of -
the statute. Moreover, although the facts of Agsalud are distin-
guishable, its reasoning is entitled to consideration for two 
reasons. ~ all, ~urt summarily affirmed it. ~ 
t\~ 
5. 
Congress specifically reversed other parts of this decision. As 
the SG notes, this legislative response suggests that Congress 
agreed with the relevant portions of the decision. Accordingly, 
I would find that the State's involvement in this case does not 
preclude the employer's obligation to pay severance pay from 
being a "plan ••• maintained by an employer." 
The second point is more difficult. The statute's com-
mand to the employer has certainly not created the cumbersome 
bureaucratic organization that is the typical ERISA plan. Maine 
argues that the employer's obligation to pay is not an ERISA 
plan. Although I think this is a good argument, I am inclined to 
disagree. The statute extends to any "plan, fund, or program 
which is established ••• for the purpose of providing [covered 
benefits]." 29 u.s.c. §1002(1). "Program" seems to be a vague 
word that could be extended to cover informal obligations like 
this. This view is bolstered by the leading precedent on the 
definition of "plan," Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (CAll 
1985) ~;e~dbold~J.). Surprisingly, all of the par-
ties suggest that the Donovan analysis should be applied here. 
That case established a four-part test for whether less formal 
arrangements had reached the status of a "program" under ERISA. 
"A court must determine whether from the sur rounding circum-
stances a reasonable person could ascertain the [1] intended 
benefits, [ 2] benef ici aries, [ 3] source of financing, and [ 4] 
procedures for receiving benefits." 688 F.2d, at 1373. Applica-
tion of this test to the Maine statute strongly suggests that the 
aine statute creates a plan The statute clearly describes the 
6. 
benefits--severance pay calculated at 1 week's salary per year of 
employment. The beneficiaries are employees who lose their jobs 
because of the closing or relocation of a covered establishment. 
The payments are financed from the employer's general funds. The 
benefits can be recovered either by an independent lawsuit or 
proceedings brought by the Maine Bureau of Labor Standards. 
An independent provision of the statute also provides a 
strong indication that payments mandated by state laws like this 
are plans preempted by §514 (a) • § 4 (b) ( 3) of ERISA, 29 U.s. c. 
§1003(b) (3) preserves from preemption any plan "maintained solely 
for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensa-
tion laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance 
laws." If compliance with a state law requiring employee bene-
fits did not create a "plan" within the scope of §514(a), Con-
gress would have had no need to preserve some of those 1 aws in 
§4(b) (3). [I address later appee's contention that this section 
preserves Maine's severance pay statute. See infra, at 8-9.) 
The final point in appt's favor is this Court's previous 
interpretation of §514(a). In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
u.s. 85 ( 1983), the Court considered a state 1 aw that mandated 
payment of certain disability benefits. After quoting some broad 
dictionary definitions of the word "relate," the Court concluded 
that "the Disability Benefits Law, which requires employers to 
pay employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate[s) to' benefit 
plans." Id., at 97. Although the parties do not rely on this 
statement, it seems rather closely on point. 
7. 
There are relatively strong pol icy arguments on the 
State's side. The provision of minimum employee benefits is 
squarely within traditional state powers. It seems quite strange 
for Congress to preempt the State's ability to require payment of 
such benefits. Moreover, the language of ERISA preempts only 
"employee benefit plans," not "employee benefits." Although appt 
argues persuasively that this law can be construed to create a 
plan, the full import of his argument is that ERISA in fact 
preepts all state employee benefit laws. This is a troubling 
conclusion, that I am reluctant to accept. / ~ 
But I doubt that this discomfort should overcome the 
broad preemptive force of §514(a). Congress clearly intended to 
- ------------ -------
sweep very broadly. It specifically included several exceptions 
to preemption for areas where it thought traditional State regu-
lation was particularly important. See §514 (b) (2) (A) (the insur-
ance saving clause at issue in No. 85-1043, Pilot Life (argued in 
January); §4 (b) ( 3) (preserving unemployment compensation, work-
men's compensation, and disability insurance laws). It did not 
include a saving clause for this statute, perhaps because sever-
ance statutes did not occur to it while it was drafting the sav-
ing clauses. 
~ I conclude that the effect of the Maine statute ~-
1 1 ~J al-wnu.L 
is to create a plan, and thus that the statute is within the m;;,e- ~a..i-G-t-
emptive field of §514(a). 
2. Does ERISA preempt the Maine statute because of its 
effect on traditional plans.--Even if you disagree with this con-
clusion, you could find that the statute is preempted because of 
8. 
its effects on more traditional plans. Two points are relevant. 
First, the statute encourages employers to enter contracts about 
employee benefits, so they can (i) insert a provision providing 
lower severance benefits than the Maine statute, and (ii) avoid 
the full force of the Maine statute. This incentive to form 
ERISA plans, the SG argues, conflicts with ERISA. Congress did 
not intend to force employers to provide any benefits in particu-------- --------~~~------~------_;------------~ 
1 ar; it intended only that they provide them fairly. Although 
this argument has some force, I am not overwhelmed. Generally, 
you might think that when Congress legislates merely to prevent 
unfairness in particular transactions, it does not intend to pre-
vent the states from encouraging, or discouraging, those transac-
tions. Cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646-647 (1982) 
(your concurring opinion). But in this case Congress has used a 
broad preemption provision to preempt any state law .that "re-
lates" to plans. This Court has concluded that "relates" in-
eludes the meanings "pertain" and "bring into assocation with or 
connection with." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 u.s. 85, 97, n. 
16 (1983). Using this broad interpretation of "relate," I think__ 
the SG's argument has some merit. 
Second, the SG posits a multi-state employer, whose 
ERISA plan does not mention severance pay. But he must pay his 
Maine employees severance pay. Accordingly, to maintain uniform-
ity in plan benefits, he must amend his plan to deal with the 
requirements of Maine law. Although this problem might seem tri-
fling, Congress thought ERISA would end such problems. Under 
ERISA, multistate employers who draft plans complying with ERISA 
9. 
should be able to pay all their employees the benefits provided 
by the plans, and not be required to make individual assessments 
of rights under various state 1 aws. The interference of the 
Maine statute with ERISA in such a case is indisputable. The 
problem with this argument is that §514(a) does not preempt all 
State laws that relate to plans; rather, it preempts State laws 
only "insofar as they ••• relate" to plans. The case before the 
Court involves an employer who did not have an ERISA plan, and 
did not have to deal with the law. Thus, this problem did not 
eventuate in this case, and is thus arguably irrelevant. 
I think these points are marginal. Even if you believe 
the statute itself does not create a "plan," you could find that 
its incentive to create plans and its interference with preexist-
ing plans suggest that it should be covered by §514(a). This 
would be a close question, however. 
3. Is the Maine Statute saved by the unemployment com-~ 
pensation saving clause?--The State argues that, even if the 
statute is within the coverage of §514(a), it is saved by 
§4(b) (3) 's reference to "unemployment compensation insurance 
laws. n I agree with the SG that this argument is meritless. 
First, §4 protects plans maintained solely for the specified pur-
poses. Although one of the goals of severance pay is to ease the 
rigors of unemployment, unemployment is not a necessary condition 
of receiving benefits. Because employees can receive benefits 
even when they are employed, it is hard to see how the statute is 
designed "solely" to redress the pain of unemployment. 
10. 
Second, ERISA appears to preserve plans maintained to 
comply only with "unemployment compensation ••• insurance laws." 
Although the statute might deal with "unemployment compensation," 
it is impossible to characterize the statute as an "insurance" 
law. I agree with the SG that Congress clearly was referring to 
statutes like the federal FICA program, that operate like (poorly 
managed) insurance funds, spreading the risk of unemployment to 
all. In this case, there is no risk-spreading whatsoever, but 
simply payments by the responsible employer to the injured em-
ployees. 
*** 
Thus, I recommend that you vote to reverse the Maine set 
on the ground that ( i) the statute is preempted by §514 (a) of 
ERISA, 29 u.s.c. §1144(a), and (ii) it is not an "unemployment 
compensation insurance law" protected by §4(b) (3), 29 u.s.c. 
§1003 (b) {3). 
III. NLRA PREEMPTION 
I agree with the SG that the NLRA argument is very weak; 
I will not burden you with lengthy discussion. In Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 470 u.s. 724 (1985), the Court 
found that the NLRA did not preempt a state statute requiring the 
inclusion of certain health benefits in employee health insurance 
policies. "Minimum state labor standards affect union and non-
union employees equally, and neither encourage nor discourage the 
collective-bargaining processes that are the subject of the 
NLRA." Id., at 755. In all relevant respects, this case is in-
distinguishable. The statute reflects the Maine legislature's 
11. 
conclusion that all employees should be provided this floor of 
severance pay. This is not so big a bargaining chip that it will 
give unions an unfair edge at the bargaining table. Indeed, be-
cause Maine allows unions to bargain away the severance pay pro-
vided by the statute, unions gain almost no bargaining power from 
the statute. In sum, I see nothing in this statute that has a 
significant effect on, much less conflicts with, the federal 
labor policy. I recommend affirmance on this point. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I recommend that you find the Maine severance pay stat-
ute preempted by ERISA. 
1. The statute requires employers to pay one of the 
types of employee benefits that Congres~ intended to be governed 
exclusively by ERISA. This in itself arguably conflicts with 
Congress' desire to leave employers free to pay whatever benefits ---...__ _ 
they wished in this area# .- Moreover, it encourages employers to 
~~ 
draft plans to avoid the statute, and hinders uniformity in the 
administration of preexisting plans. I think these effects "re-
late to" plans covered by ERISA. Of course, the argument on the 
other side is considerable; you may hesitate before concluding 
that Congress intended to preempt such a statute. But the broad 
language of §514, coupled with this Court's past broad interpre--- ' tation of that language, suggest that the Maine statute is pre-
empted. 
2. I would reject appee' s contention that this is an 
unemployment compensation insurance 1 aw covered by 29 u.s. C. 
12. 
§1003(b) (3). Whatever this law is, it is not an insurance law of 
any kind. 
~. I would reject appee' s contention that this law is 
preempted by the NLRA. 
I recommend that you vote to reverse the Maine Supreme 
Court. 
. ,--
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No. 86-341, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne 
1. Severance benefits clearly are covered by ERISA. See 
29 u.s.c. §1002(1) (incorporating by reference 29 u.s.c. S186(c), 
that includes "severance benefits"); Holland v. Burlington 
Industries, Inc., 772 F. 2d 1140, 1144-1146 (CA4 1985) (per Wil-
kinson, J.), aff'd mem., No. 85-944, 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986). 
2. The fact that the State has required this arrangement 
is irrelevant. S514(a) covers all plans "established or main-
tained by an employer." This excludes only plans established "by 
government entities for government employees." See CA9's Agsalud 
decision. Appt concedes this would be a plan if it were con-
tained in an agreement negotiated between the employer and the 
union. The result should be no different because the government 
mandates the result. As we said in Shaw, a statute "which re-
quires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly 're-
late[s] to' benefit plans." 
3. This is not an unemployment compensation insurance 
law. When Congress exempted unemployment compensation insurance 
lawsfrompreemption,itwasreferringtoSocialSecurityand 
other similar programs . 
.. 
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Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
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May 5, 1987 
Re: 86-341 Fort Halifax Packing Company v. Coyne, et al. 
Dear Bill, 
I will wait for the dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Ronald 
Re: No. 86-341, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne 
In this case, you changed your vote at Conference to agree 
with JUSTICE STEVENS's position, that would support affirmance. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion for this result is in. Although all is 
not clear from your Conference notes, I do not think that JUSTICE 
BRENNAN's opinion follows the rationale you accepted. In any 
event, I do not find his opinion particularly persuasive. I can 
talk to you about this in detail at your convenience. If you 
wish, I can give a detailed discussion of my disagreements with 
the opinion. Myfl current recommendation, though, is to send him 
a note saying that for the time being you will await further 
writing. This will preserve all your options and allow us to see 
what others have in mind. 
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From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: _ _:M=A__::_R_:_____5 _1_98_1 _ _ _ 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-341 
FORT HALIFAX PACKING COMPANY, INC., APPEL-
LANT v. P. DANIEL COYNE, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STANDARDS OF MAINE, ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE 
[May -, 1987] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we must decide whether a Maine statute re-
quiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment 
to employees in the event of a plant closing, 26 M.R.S.A. 
§ 625-B (1986 Supp.), 1 is preempted by either the Employee 
' The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"2. Severance pay. Any employer who relocates or terminates a covered 
establishment shall be liable to his employees for severance pay at the rate 
of one week's pay for each year of employment by the employee in that 
establishment. The severance pay to eligible employees shall be in addi-
tion to any final wage payment to the employee and shall be paid within one 
regular pay period after the employee's last full day of work, notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law. 
3. Mitigation of severance pay liability. There shall be no liability for sev-
erance pay to an eligible employee if: 
A. Relocation or termination of a covered establishment is necessitated by 
a physical calamity; 
B. The employee is covered by an express contract providing for sever-
ance pay; 
C. That employee accepts employment at the new location; or 
D. That employee has been employed by the employer for less than 3 
years." 
§ 625-B(1)(A) defines "covered establishment" as a facility that employs 
100 or more persons, while § 625-B(l)(F) defines "relocation" as the re-
moval of all or substantially all operations at least 100 miles away from 
their original location. 
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Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1381 
(ERISA), or the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§§ 157-158 (NLRA). The statute was upheld by the Maine 
Superior Court, Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982), 
and by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 510 A. 2d 1054 
(1986). We granted certioriari, -- U. S. -- (1986), and 
now affirm. 
I 
In 1972, Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort Halifax or 
Company) purchased a poultry packaging and processing 
plant that had operated in Winslow, Maine for almost two 
decades. The Company continued to operate the plant for 
almost another decade, until, on May 23, 1981, it discontin-
ued operations at the plant and laid off all its employees ex-
cept several maintenance and clerical workers. At the time 
of closing, over 100 employees were on the payroll. Forty-
five had worked in the plant for over 10 years, 19 for over 20 
years, and two for 29 years. Plaintiff's Supplementary Re-
sponse to Employee List, Exhibit A (June 3, 1983). Follow-
ing the closing, the Company met with State officials and 
with representatives of Local 385 of the Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, which repre-
sented many of the employees who had worked in the plant. 
While Fort Halifax initially suggested that reopening the 
plant might be feasible if the union agreed to certain conces-
sions in the form of amendments to the collective bargaining 
agreement, ultimately the Company decided against resum-
ing operations and to close the plant. 
On October 30, 1981, eleven employees filed suit in Supe-
rior Court seeking severance pay pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 
§ 625-B (1986 Supp.). This statute, note 1, supra, provides 
that any employer that terminates operations at a plant with 
100 or more employees, or relocates those operations more 
than 100 miles away, must provide one week's pay for each 
year of employment to all employees who have worked in the 
plant at least three years. The employer has no such liabil-
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ity if the employee accepts employment at the new location, 
or if the employee is covered by a contract that deals with the 
issue of severance pay. I d., at § 625-B(2)-(3). Under au-
thority granted by the statute, the Maine Director of the Bu-
reau of Labor Standards also commenced an action to enforce 
the provisions of the state law, which action superceded the 
suit filed by the employees. 2 
The Superior Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, granted the Director's motion, holding that Fort 
Halifax is liable for severance pay under the statute. Civ. 
Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982). The Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed. 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986). The court 
rejected the Company's contention that the plant-closing 
statute was preempted by ERISA, holding that ERISA pre-
empted only benefit plans created by employers or employee 
organizations. I d., at 1059. It observed that the severance 
pay liability in this case results from the operation of the 
state statute, rather than from the operation of an employer-
created benefit plan. Ibid. Therefore, reasoned the court, 
"[i]nasmuch as § 625-B does not implicate a plan created by 
an employer or employee organization, it cannot be said to be 
preempted by ERISA." Ibid. The court also rejected the 
argument that the state provision was preempted by the 
NLRA because it regulated conduct covered by either §§ 7 or 
8 of that statute. It found that the Maine statute applies 
equally to union and nonunion employees, and reflects "the 
state's substantial interest in protecting Maine citizens from 
2 Section 625-B(5) of the Maine statute provides in relevant part: 
"5. Suits by the director. The director is authorized to supervise the pay-
ment of the unpaid severance pay owing to any employee under this sec-
tion. The director may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion to recover the amount of any unpaid severance pay. The right 
provided by subsection 4 to bring an action by or on behalf of any em-
ployee, and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, 
shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the director in an action 
under this subsection, unless the action is dismissed without prejudice by 
the director . . . " 
.. 
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the economic dislocation that accompanies large-scale plant 
closings." I d., at 1062. As a result, the court found that 
eligible employees were entitled to severance pay due to the 
closure of the plant at Winslow. 3 
We hold that the Maine statute is not preempted by 
ERISA, not for the reason offered by the Maine Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, but because the statute neither establishes, nor 
requires an employer to maintain, an employee welfare bene-
fit "plan" under that federal statute. 4 We hold further that 
the Maine law is not preempted by the NLRA, since it estab-
lishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon 
the collective bargaining process. As a result, we affirm the 
judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the 
Maine statute is not preempted by either ERISA or the 
NLRA. 
II 
Appellant's basic argument is that any state law p~rtaining 
to a type of employee benefit listed in ERISA necessarily 
regulates an employee benefit plan, and therefore must be 
preempted. Because severance benefits are included in 
ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1)(B), appellant argues that 
ERISA preempts the Maine statute. 5 In effect, appellant 
3 Ninety-three employees of the plant are eligible for lump-sum pay-
ments ranging from $490 to $11,500. The total amount due is about 
$256,600. Affidavit of Xavier J. Dietrich, Exhibit A (August 13, 1984). 
• Because we hold that the obligation created by the Maine statute does 
not involve a plan, we do not address the State's alternative argument 
that, even if the law does establish a plan, it is not preempted by virtue of 
the exemption for plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying 
with applicable ... unemployment compensation laws." 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1003(b)(3). 
5 Section 1002(1)(B) defines an employee welfare benefit plan as a plan 
that pays, inter alia, benefits described in 29 U. S. C. ~ 186(c). The latter 
section includes, inter alia, money paid by an employer to a trust fund to 
pay for severance benefits. Section 1002(1)(B) has been construed to in-
clude severance benefits paid out of general assets, as well as out of a trust 
fund. See Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d 1140 (CA4 1985), 
aff'd mem.,- U. S.- (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 765 
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argues that ERISA forecloses virtually all state legislation 
regarding employee benefits. This contention fails, how-
ever, in light of the plain language of ERISA's preemption 
provision, the underlying purpose of that provision, and the 
overall objectives of ERISA itself. 
A 
The first answer to appellant's argument is found in the ex-
press language of the statute. ERISA's preemption provi-
sion does not refer to state laws relating to "employee bene-
fits", but to state laws relating to "employee benefit plans": 
"the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereaf-
ter relate to any employee benefit plan described in 
§ 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under § 1003(b) of 
this title." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added). 
We have held that the words "relate to" should be construed 
expansively: "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in 
the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or 
reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U. S. 
85, 97 (1983). Nothing in our case law, however, supports 
appellant's position that the word "plan" should in effect be 
read out of the statute. Indeed, Shaw itself speaks of a state 
law's connection with or reference to a plan. Ibid. The 
words "benefit" and "plan" are used separately throughout 
ERISA, and nowhere in the statute are they treated as the 
equivalent of one another. Given the basic difference be-
tween a "benefit" and a "plan," Congress' choice of language 
is significant in its preemption of only the latter. 
Thus, as a first matter, the language of the ERISA 
presents a formidable obstacle to appellant's argument. The 
reason for Congress' decision to legislate with respect to 
plans rather than to benefits becomes plain upon examination 
F. 2d 320 (CA21985), aff'd mem.,- U. S.- (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 754 F . 2d 1499 (CA9 1985); 29 CFR § 2510.3- 1(a)(3) (1986). See 
also discussion, infra, at -. 
I • 
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of the purpose of both the preemption section and the regula-
tory scheme as a whole. 
B 
The second answer to appellant's argument is that preemp-
tion of the Maine statute would not further the purpose of 
ERISA preemption. In analyzing whether ERISA's pre-
emption section is applicable to the Maine law, "as in any pre-
emption analysis, 'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone."' Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 747 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)). Attention to pur-
pose is particularly necessary in this case because the terms 
"employee benefit plan" and "plan" are defined only tauto-
logically in the statute, each being described as "an employee 
welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan or a 
plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an 
employee pension benefit plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1002(3). 
Statements by ERISA's sponsors in the House and Senate 
clearly disclose the problem that the preemption provision 
was intended to address. In the House, Representative 
Dent stated that "with the preemption of the field [of em-
ployee benefit plans], we round out the protection afforded 
participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and in-
consistent State and local regulation." 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 
(1974). Similarly, Senator Williams declared, "It should be 
stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, 
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference 
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regu-
lations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsist-
ent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans." 
I d., at 29933. 
These statements reflect recognition of the administrative 
realities of employee benefit plans. An employer that makes 
a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits under-
takes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility 
of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disburse-
86-341-0PINION 
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ments, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit pay-
ments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply . 
with applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient 
way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform 
administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard pro-
cedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of 
benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a 
benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in 
differing states. A plan would be required to keep certain 
records in some states but not in others; to make certain 
benefits available in some states but not in others; to process 
claims in a certain way in some states but not in others; and 
to comply with certain fiduciary standards in some states but 
not in others. 
We have not hesitated to enforce ERISA's preemption pro-
vision where State law created the prospect that an employ-
er's administrative scheme would be subject to conflicting re-
quirements. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 
U. S. 504 (1981), for instance, we struck down a New Jersey 
statute that prohibited offsetting worker compensation pay-
ments against pension benefits. Since such a practice is per-
missible under federal law and the law of other States, the 
effect of the statute was to force the employer either to struc-
ture all its benefit payments in accordance with New Jersey 
law, or to adopt different payment formulae for employees in-
side and outside the State. The employer therefore was re-
quired to accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in de-
vising and operating a system for processing claims and 
paying benefits-precisely the burden that ERISA preemp-
tion was intended to avoid. 
This point was emphasized in Shaw, supra, where we said 
with respect to another form of State regulation, "[o]bligat-
ing the employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting 
requirements of particular state fair employment laws ... 
would make administration of a nationwide plan more diffi-
cult." 463 U. S., at 105 n. 25. Such a situation would 
'. 
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produce considerable inefficiencies, which the employer 
might choose to offset by lowering benefit levels. As the 
Court in Shaw indicated, "ERISA's comprehensive preemp-
tion of state law was meant to minimize this sort of interfer-
ence with the administration of employee benefit plans," 
ibid., so that employers would not have to "administer their 
plans differently in each State in which they have employ-
ees." I d., at 105 (footnote omitted). 
This concern about the effect of state regulation on the ad-
ministration of benefit programs is reflected in Shaw's hold-
ing that only disability programs administered separately 
from other benefit plans fall within ERISA's preemption ex-
emption for plans maintained "for the purpose of complying 
with disability insurance laws." 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1003(b)(3). To permit the exemption to apply to disability 
benefits paid under a multibenefit plan was held to be incon-
sistent with the purpose of ERISA's preemption provision: 
"An employer with employees in several States would 
find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern 
of regulation in each State, depending on what benefits 
the State mandated under disability, workmen's com-
pensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The 
administrative impracticality of permitting mutually ex-
clusive pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a 
plan is apparent." Id., at 107-108. 
It is thus clear that ERISA's preemption provision was 
prompted by recognition that employers establishing and 
maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of 
coordinating complex administrative activities. A patch-
work scheme of regulation would introduce considerable in-
efficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead 
those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and 
those without such plans to r~frain from adopting them. 
Preemption ensures that the adminstrative practices of a 
benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regula-
tions. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 1st 
86-341-0PINION 
FORT HAL IF AX PACKING CO. v. COYNE 9 
Sess. 12 (1973) ("[A] fiduciary standard embodied in Federal 
legislation is considered desirable because it will bring a 
measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the 
same set of facts ·may differ from state to state"). 
Awareness of the purposes of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion makes clear that the Maine statute in no way raises the 
types of concerns that prompted preemption. Congress in-
tended preemption to afford employers the advantages of a 
uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a sin-
gle set of regulations. This concern only arises, however, 
· with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires 
an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's 
obligation. It is for this reason that Congress preempted 
state laws relating to plans, rather than simply to benefits. 
Only a plan embodies a set of administrative practices vulner-
able to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork 
scheme of regulation. 
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an em-
ployer to maintain, an employee benefit plan. The require-
ment of a one-time lump-sum payment triggered by a single 
event requires no administrative scheme whatsoever to meet 
the employer's obligation. The employer assumes no 
responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, and thus 
faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a need for 
financial coordination and control. Rather, the employer's 
obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contin-
gency that may never materialize. The employer may well 
never have to pay the severance benefits. To the extent that 
the obligation to do so arises , satisfaction of that duty in-
volves only making a single set of payments to employees at 
the time the plant closes. To do little more than write a 
check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan. 6 
6 In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt from preemption certain 
provisions of the Hawaii Act in place before the enactment of ERISA, 
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-1 through 393-51 (1976 and 1984 Supp.). 29 
U. S. C. § 1144(b)(5). The amendment did not exempt from preemption 
. ' 
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Once this single event is over, the employer has no further 
responsibility. The theoretical possibility of a one-time ob-
ligation in the future simply creates no need for an ongoing 
administrative program for processing claims and paying 
benefits. · 
This point is underscored by comparing the consequences 
of the Maine statute with those produced by a state statute 
requiring the establishment of a benefit plan. In Standard 
Oil of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), aff'd 
mem., 454 U. S. 801 (1981), for instance, Hawaii had re-
quired that employers provide employees with a comprehen-
sive health care plan. The Hawaii law was struck down, for 
it posed two types of problems. 7 First, the employer in that 
case already had in place a health care plan governed by 
ERISA, which did not comply in all respects with the Hawaii 
Act. If the employer sought to achieve administrative ef-
ficiencies by integrating the Hawaii plan into its existing 
plan, different components of its single plan would be subject 
to different requirements. If it established a separate plan 
to administer the program directed by Hawaii, it would lose 
the benefits of maintaining a single administrative scheme. 
Second, if Hawaii could demand the operation of a particular 
benefit plan, so could other states, which would require that 
the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs. 
Agsalud thus illustrates that whether a State requires an ex-
isting plan to pay certain benefits, or whether it requires the 
establishment of a separate plan where none existed before, 
the problem is the same. Faced with the difficulty or impos-
sibility of structuring administrative practices according to a 
those portions of the law dealing with reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary 
requirements. 
'See Martori Bros . Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F . 2d 1349, 
1358, amended on other grounds, 791 F. 2d 799 (CA9), cert. denied, -
U. S. -, - (1986) ("It is difficult to see how the making of one-time 
lump sum payments could constitute the establishment of a plan"). Cf. 
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F. 2d 1367, 1373 (CAll 1982) ("A decision to 
extend benefits is not the establishment of a plan or program") . 
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set of uniform guidelines, an employer may decide to reduce 
benefits or simply not to pay them at all. 
By contrast, the Maine law does not put the employer to 
the choice of either: (1) integrating a state-mandated ongoing 
benefit plan with an existing plan or (2) establishing a sepa-
rate plan to process and pay benefits under the plan required 
by the State. This is because there is no State-mandated 
benefit plan to administer. In this case, for instance, Fort 
Halifax found no need to respond to passage of the Maine 
statute by setting up an administrative scheme to meet its 
contingent statutory obligation, any more than it would find 
it necessary to set up an ongoing scheme to deal with the ob-
ligations it might face in the event that some day it might go 
bankrupt. The company makes no contention that its statu-
tory duty has in any way hindered its ability to operate its 
retirement plan in uniform fashion, a plan that pays retire-
ment, death, and permanent and total disability benefits on 
an ongoing basis. App. 40. · The obligation imposed by the 
Maine statute thus differs radically in impact from a require-
ment that an employer pay ongoing benefits on a continuous 
basis. 
The Maine statute therefore creates no impediment to an 
employer's adoption of a uniform benefit administrative 
scheme. Neither the possibility of a one-time payment in 
the future, nor the act of making such a payment, in any way 
creates the potential for the type of conflicting regulation of 
benefit plans that ERISA preemption was intended to pre-
vent. 8 As a result, preemption of the Maine law would not 
8 Appellant notes that death benefits sometimes involve a one-time pay-
ment to beneficiaries, and that ERISA nonetheless defines an employee 
welfare benefit plan to include a program that pays such benefits. 29 
U. S. C. § 1002(1). Thus, it contends, the fact that the Maine statute re-
quires a single payment does not mean that the statute does not establish a 
plan. This argument, however, misunderstands what it is that makes a 
plan a plan. While death benefits may represent a one-time payment from 
the perspective of the beneficiaries, the employer clearly foresees the need 
to make regular payments to survivors on an ongoing basis. The ongoing, 
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serve the purpose for which ERISA's preemption provision 
was enacted. 
c 
The third answer to appellant's argument is that the Maine 
statute not only fails to implicate the concerns of ERISA's 
preemption provision, it fails to implicate the regulatory con-
cerns of ERISA itself. The Congressional declaration of pol-
icy, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1001, states that ERISA was en-
acted because Congress found it desirable that "disclosure be 
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the estab-
lishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit] 
plans." I d., at § 1001(a). Representative Dent, the House 
sponsor of the legislation, represented that ERISA's fidu-
ciary standards "will prevent abuses of the special respon-
sibilities borne by those dealing with plans." 120 Cong. Rec. 
29197 (1974). Senator Williams, the Senate sponsor, stated 
that these standards would safeguard employees from "such 
abuses as self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappro-
priation of plan funds." I d., at 29932 (197 4). The focus of 
the statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit 
plans-which presumes that some type of administrative ac-
tivity is taking place. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1785, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 46 ("In electing deliberately to preclude state 
authority over these plans, Congress acted to insure uniform-
ity of regulation with respect to their activities'); 120 Cong. 
Rec. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent) (disclosure andre-
porting requirements "will enable both participants and the 
Federal Government to monitor the plans' operations") (em-
predictable nature of this obligation therefore creates the need for an ad-
ministrative scheme to process claims and pay out benefits, whether those 
benefits are received by beneficiaries in a lump sum or on a periodic basis. 
This is borne out by the fact that death benefits are included in appellant's 
retirement plan, with instructions on how eligibility is to be determined, 
benefit levels calculated, and disbursements made. App. 54-56. By con-
trast, appellant's statutory obligation did not prompt the establishment of 
any payment program, since there were no ongoing benefits to be paid. 
•. 
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phasis added); id., at 29935 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits) 
(disclosure meant to provide employees information "cover-
ing in detail the fiscal operations of their plan") (emphasis 
added). 
The foregoing makes clear both why ERISA is concerned 
with regulating benefit "plans," and why the Maine statute 
does not establish one. Only "plans" involve administrative 
activity potentially subject to employer abuse. The obliga-
tion imposed by Maine generates no such activity. There is 
no occasion to determine whether a "plan" is "operated" in 
the interest of its beneficiaries, because nothing is "oper-
ated." No financial transactions take place that would be 
listed in an annual report, and no further information regard-
ing the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed be-
cause the statute itself makes these terms clear. It would 
make no sense for preemption to clear the way for exclusive 
federal regulation, for there would be nothing to regulate. 
Under such circumstances, preemption would in no way 
serve the overall purpose of ERISA. 
D 
Appellant contends that failure to preempt the Maine law 
will create the opportunity for employers to circumvent 
ERISA's regulatory requirements by persuading a State to 
require the type of benefit plan that the employer otherwise 
would establish on its own. That may be so under the ra-
tionale offered by the state Supreme Court, but that is not 
the rationale on which we rely today. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rested its decision on 
the premise that ERISA only preempts state regulation of 
preexisting benefit plans established by the employer, and 
not state-mandated benefit plans. We agree that such an 
approach would afford employers a readily available means of 
evading ERISA's regulatory scope, thereby depriving em-
ployees of the protections of that statute. In addition, it 
would permit States to circumvent ERISA's preemption pro-
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vision, by allowing them to require directly what they are 
forbidden to regulate. In contrast, our analysis of the pur-
pose of ERISA preemption makes clear why the mere fact 
that a plan is required by a State is insufficient to fend off 
preemption. The requirements imposed by a State's estab-
lishment of a benefit plan would pose a formidable barrier to 
the development of a uniform set of administrative practices. 
As Agsalud, supra, illustrates, an employer would be put to 
the choice of operating separate ongoing benefit plans or a 
single plan subject to different regulatory requirements, and 
would face the prospect that numerous other States would 
impose their own distinct requirements-a result squarely in-
consistent with the goal of ERISA preemption. 
Appellant's arguments are thus well taken insofar as they 
are addressed to the reasoning of the court below. We have 
demonstrated, supra, however, they have no force with re-
spect to a state statute that, as here, does not establish a 
plan. Such a statute generates no program activity that nor-
mally would be subject to ERISA regulation. Enforcement 
of the Maine statute presents no risk either that an employer 
will evade or that a State will dislodge otherwise applicable 
federal regulatory requirements. Nor is there any prospect 
that an employer will face difficulty in operating a unified ad-
ministrative scheme for paying benefits. The rationale on 
which we rely thus does not create the dangers that appellant 
contends will result from upholding the Maine law. 
Appellant also argues that its contention that the sever-
ance obligation under the Maine statute is an ERISA plan is 
supported by Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d 
1140 (CA4 1985), aff'd mem. , - U. S. - (1986), and Gil-
bert v. Burlington Industries, 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), aff'd 
mem., -- U. S. -- (1986). We disagree. Those cases 
hold that a plan that pays severance benefits out of general 
assets is an ERISA plan. That holding is completely con-
sistent with our analysis above. There was no question in 
the Burlington cases, as there is in this case, whether the 
.. 
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employer had a "plan"; 9 there was a "plan" and the only issue 
was whether the type of benefits paid by that plan are among 
those covered by ERISA. The precise question was simply 
whether severance benefits paid by a plan out of general as-
sets, rather than out of a trust fund, should be regarded as 
employee welfare benefits under 29 U. S. C. § 1002. 10 
The courts' conclusion that they should be so regarded took 
into account ERISA's central focus on administrative integ-
rity: if an employer has an administrative scheme for paying 
benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of 
the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general as-
sets. Some severence benefit obligations by their nature ne-
cessitate an ongoing administrative scheme, but others do 
not. Those that do not, such as the obligation imposed in 
this case, simply do not involve a state law that "relate[s] to" 
an employee benefit "plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). 11 The 
Burlington cases therefore do not support appellant's 
argument. 
E 
ERISA preemption analysis "must be guided by respect 
for the separate spheres of governmental authority pre-
served in our federalist system." Alessi v. Raybestos-M an-
9 The employer had made a commitment to pay severance benefits to em-
ployees as each person left employment. This commitment created the 
need for an administrative scheme to pay these benefits on an ongoing 
basis, and the company had distributed both a Policy Manual and Employ-
ees' Handbook that provided details on matters such as eligibility, benefit 
levels, and payment schedules. 772 F. 2d, at 1143-1144 and n. 1; 765 F. 
2d, at 323. 
10 The question arose because§ 1002(1)(B) provides that an employee wel-
fare benefit plan includes a plan that provides benefits described in 29 
U. S. C. § 186(c). The latter section lists , inter alia, money paid by an 
employer to a trust fund for severance benefits. 
"Thus, if a State required a benefit whose regularity of payment neces-
sarily required an ongoing benefit program, it could not evade preemption 
by the simple expedient of somehow formally characterizing the obligation 
as a one-time lump-sum payment triggered by the occurrence of a certain 
contingency. 
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hattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 522 (1981). The argument that 
ERISA preempts state laws relating to certain employee 
benefits, rather than to employee benefit plans, is refuted by 
the express language of the statute, the purposes of the pre-
emption provision, and the regulatory focus of ERISA as a 
whole. If a State creates no prospect of conflict with a fed-
eral statute, there is no warrant for disabling it from at-
tempting to address uniquely local social and economic prob-
lems. 12 Since the Maine severance payment statute raises no 
danger of such conflict, we hold that the statute is not pre-
empted by ERISA. 
III 
Appellant also contends that Maine's statute is preempted 
by the NLRA. In so arguing, the Company relies on the 
strand of NLRA preemption analysis that forbids States 
from "imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons 
of self-help." Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los An-
geles,-- U.S.--,-- (1986). 13 Restriction on state ac-
tivity in this area rests on the theory that preemption is nec-
essary to further Congress' intent that "the conduct involved 
be unregulated because left 'to be controlled by the free play 
of economic forces.'" Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 427 U. S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB 
v. Nash-Finch co., 404 U. S. 138, 144 (1971)). 
Appellant concedes that, unlike cases in which state laws 
have been struck down under this doctrine, Maine has not di-
'
2 During the decade between 1971 and 1981, a total of 107 plants were 
closed in Maine, resulting in the direct loss of 21,215 jobs. Leighton, Plant 
Closings in Maine: Law and Reality, in Plant Closing Legislation 1 (A. 
Aboud ed., 1984). Taking into account the multiplier effects of these job 
losses on the local communities, it is estimated that the total number of 
jobs lost in Maine during this period was 49,219. !d., at 3. These losses 
were concentrated in the poorer counties of the State and in the lower 
wage industries, resulting in a significant burden on local public and pri-
vate social service agencies. I d., at 4. 
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rectly regulated any economic activity of either of the par-
ties. See, e. g., Machinists, supra, (State enjoined union 
members from continuing to refuse to work overtime); Gar-
ner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953) (State enjoined 
union picketing). Nor has the State sought directly to force 
a party to forgo the use of one of its economic weapons. See, 
e. g., Golden State Transit, supra, (City Council conditioned 
taxicab franchise renewal on settlement of strike). None-
theless, appellant maintains that the Maine law intrudes on 
the bargaining activities of the parties because the prospect 
of a statutory obligation undercuts an employer's ability to 
withstand a union's. demand for severance pay. 
This argument-that a State's establishment of minimum 
substantive labor standards undercuts collective bargain-
ing-was considered and rejected in Metropolitan Life, 
supra. That case involved a state law requiring that 
minimumum mental health benefits be provided under cer-
tain health insurance p<1licies. Appellants there presented 
the same argument that appellant makes in this case: "be-
cause Congress intended to leave the choice of terms in col-
lective-bargaining agreements to the free play of economic 
forces, ... mandated-benefit laws should be preempted by 
the NLRA." 471 U. S., at 748. The Court held, however, 
that the NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bar-
gaining process, not with the substantive terms that may 
emerge from such bargaining. "The evil Congress was ad-
dressing thus was entirely unrelated to local or federal regu-
lation establishing minimum terms of employment." I d., at 
754. Such regulation provides protections to individual 
union and non-union workers alike, and thus "neither encour-
age[s] nor discourage[s] the collective-bargaining processes 
that are the subject of the NLRA." I d., at 755. Further-
more, preemption should not be lightly inferred in this area, 
since the establishment of labor standards falls within the 
traditional police power of the State. As a result, held the 
Court, "[ w ]hen a state law establishes a minimal employment 
~. 
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standard not inconsistent with the general legislative goals of 
the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of the Act." 
I d., at 757. It is true that the Maine statute gives em-
ployees something for which they otherwise might have to 
bargain. That is true, however, with regard to any state 
law that substantively regulates employment conditions. 
Both employers and employees come to the bargaining table 
with rights under state law that form a "backdrop" for their 
negotiations. Ibid . (quoting Taggart v. Weinacker's , Inc., 
397 U. S. 223, 228 (1970) (concurring opinion)). Absent a 
collective bargaining agreement, for instance, state common 
law generally permits an employer to run the workplace as it 
wishes. The employer enjoys this authority without having 
to bargain for it. The parties may enter negotiations de-
signed to alter this state of affairs, but, if impasse is reached, 
the employer may rely on preexisting state law to justify its 
authority to make employment decisions; that same state law 
defines the rights and duties of employees. Similarly, Maine 
provides that employer and employees may negotiate with 
the intention of establishing severance pay terms. If im-
passe is reached, however, preexisting state law determines 
the right of employees to a certain level of severance pay and 
the duty of the employer to provide it. Thus, the mere fact 
that a state statute pertains to matters over which the par-
ties are free to bargain cannot support a claim of preemption, 
for "there is nothing in the NLRA ... which expressly fore-
closes all state regulatory power with respect to those issues 
... that may be the subject of collective bargaining." Ma-
lone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504-505 (1978). 
Appellant maintains that this case is distinguishable from 
Metropolitan Life. It points out that, unlike Metropolitan 
Life, the statutory obligation at issue here is optional, since it 
applies only in the absence of an agreement between em-
ployer and employees. Therefore, the Company argues, the 
Maine law cannot be regarded as establishing a genuine mini-
mum labor standard. The fact that the parties are free to 
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devise their own severance pay arrangements, however, 
strengthens the case that the statute works no intrusion on 
collective bargaining. Maine has sought to balance the de-
sirability of a particular substantive labor standard against 
the right of self-determination regarding the terms and con-
ditions of employment. If a statute that permits no collec-
tive bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA preemption, see 
Metropolitan Life, surely one that permits such bargaining 
cannot be preempted. 14 
We therefore find that Maine's severance payment law is 
"a valid and unexceptional exercise of the [State's] police 
power." Metropolitan Life, supra, at 758. Since "Congress 
developed the framework for self-organization and collective 
bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law 
promoting public health and safety," ibid., the Maine statute 
is not preempted by the NLRA. 15 
IV 
We hold that the Maine severance pay statute is not pre-
empted by ERISA, since it does not "relate to any employee 
benefit plan" under that statute. 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). We 
hold further that the law is not preempted by the NLRA, 
since its establishment of a minimum labor standard does not 
impermissibly intrude upon the collective bargaining process. 
14 Appellant also contends that, unlike the statute in Metropolitan Life, 
the Maine law does not fall equally upon union and non-union employees. 
Non-union employers, it argues, are free unilaterally to escape their statu-
tory obligation by establishing severance payment levels, while unionized 
employers must engage in collective bargaining in order to achieve the 
same result. Any difference in the ease of establishing alternative sever-
ance payment obligations, however, flows not from the statute, but from 
the basic fact that a non-union employer is freer to set employment terms 
than is a unionized employer. 
15 We also find no support for an argument of preemption under the rule 
established in San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 v. 236 (1959), 
since the Maine statute does not purport to regulate any conduct subject to 
regulation by the National Labor Relations Board. See Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 748-749 (1985). 
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The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is 
therefore 
Affirmed. 
May 9, 1987 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-341 
FORT HALIFAX PACKING COMPANY, INC. , APPEL-
LANT v. P. DANIEL COYNE, DIRECTOR, BUREAU 
OF LABOR STANDARDS OF MAINE, ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE 
[May - , 1987] 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
The Court rejects appellant's pre-emption challenge to 
Maine's severance-pay statute by reasoning that the statute 
does not create a "plan" under ERISA because it does notre-
quire an "administrative scheme" to administer the payment 
of severance benefits. By making preemption turn on the 
existence of an "administrative scheme," the Court creates a 
loophole in ERISA's preemption statute, 29 U. . C. § 1144, 
whiCnwilTuiiaerrnine Congress' decision to make employee-
benefit plans a mat er of exc usive federa regula 10n. he 
Court's rule ~Bhs e a mmistrative 
scheme" as a prerequisite for ERISA preemption will allow 
states to effec 1ve y 1ctate a wide array of employee benefits 
that must be prov1 ed by employers by simply characterizing 
them as non-" administrative." The Court has also chosen to 
ignore completely what precedent exists as to what consti-
tutes a "plan" under ERISA. I dissent because it is incred-
ible to believe that Congress intended that the broad pre-
emption provision contained in ERISA would depend upon 
the extent to which an employer exercised administrative 
foresight in preparing for the eventual payment of employee 
benefits. 
ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to a~- em.PlQYee b~nefit 
plan .... " 29 U. S. C. § 1144. Congress defined an "em-
jWt 9~ ~ 
~t~ 
c:£~~ 
~ ~-t.,u ~Wfd56 
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ployee benefit plan" as "any plan, fund, or program which 
was heretofore or is hereafter established- ormaintained by 
an employer or an employee organization" and which pro- ~ 
vides certain benefits, incl~~s~v~r~nce p~. 29 U. S. C. (' !l Z 
§ 1002(1). See Gilbert v. /Jurlingatonton 'riU1U n ussttrries, 765 F. 2d 
ll~~ 
320, 325 (CA2 1985), summarily aff'd,- U. S.- (1986). 
A state law "which requires employers to pay employees spe- fl-~ ~~ ( ~ L-Iz 
cific benefits clearly 'relate[s] to' benefit plans" as contem- ~.-#~~) 
plated by ERISA's preemption provision. Shaw v. Delta ~ ,-----·j 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 97 (1983). I would have 
thought this to be the end of the pre-emption inquiry. Here, 
the Maine statute clearly creates an employee benefit plan, ~ 
and having created an ERISA plan, the statute plainly "re- lj 4 w ~ 
lates to" such a plan. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in /JA-........ P-<..--h.-. ~ 
effect, acknowledged as much, but held that Maine's statute a.....- & /f 1 ~A /2 i64A. 
was not preempted by ERISA because it was created by the 1 
' 
~ State Legislature instead of by a private employer. Appar- ~ 
, ~~ ently recognizing the flaw inherent in this reasoning, the rna-  u-...u 
{./.-- t.. jority nevertheless struggles to achieve its desired result by ' - f 
~ ~ asserting that the statute does not create a "plan" because it ~ ~ k 
1 
. .../ __ 
does not require an employer to establish an administrative ~ • vv l«-£f ? 
scheme. I cannot accept this conclusion. 
First, § 1002(1) establishes no requirement that a "plan" ~ nu e /It <5A 
meet any specific formalities or that there be some policy 
manual or employee handbook to effectuate it. Cf. ante, at 
--, n. 9. In reading such a requirement into§ 1002(1), the 
majority ignores the obvious: when a Maine employer is 
called upon to discharge its legislatively-mandated duty 
under the severance pay statute, the funds from which it 
pays the benefits do not materialize out of thin air. The 
Maine legislature has presumed, as it is so entitled, that em-
ployers will comply with the dictates of the statute's require-
ments. That an employer's liability is contingent upon an 
event that may never happen does not make the plan that the 
legislature has imposed upon employers any less of a plan. 
And, -heeanse there may ~ imprudent employers who 
~ IU-
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either are unaware of the severance pay statute or order 
their business affairs as if the statute's obligations do not 
exist-and it is upon the behavior of this class of employers 
that the majority seemingly relies in concluding that the sev-
erance pay statute does not embody ·an "administrative 
scheme"-in no way supports the remarkable conclusion that 
the statutory obligations do not constitute a plan for the pay-
ment of severance benefits. 
Second, in concluding that Maine's statute does not estab-
lish a "plan" as contemplated by ERISA, the Court over-
rules, sub silento, rec~ourC(iuoert v. 
Burlington Industries, 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), summarily 
aff'd, -- U. S. -- (1986), involved an employer's policy to 
pay severance benefits to employees who were involuntarily 
terminated. The employer had no separate fund from which 
to make severance-pay payments, and, of particular note, 
there was virtually no "administrative scheme" to effectuate 
the program. "The granting or denial of severance pay was 
automatic upon termination. Plaintiffs [employees] allege 
that Burlington never sought to comply with ERISA respect-
ing its severance ·pay policy. That is, they claim that: it 
never published or filed an annual report, a financial state-
ment, a plan description or a ~tatement of plan modifications; 
it did not designate a fiduciary for the plan or inform employ-
ees of their rights under ERISA and the plan; there was no 
established claims procedure; and, apart from the company's 
'open door' grievance policy, there was no established appeals 
procedure." Gilbert, supra, at 323. The employees and nu-
merous amici claimed that "a promise or agreement to pay 
severance benefits, without more, does not constitute a wel-
fare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA." I d., at 
324. The Second Circuit rejected this contention, id., at 
325, and we summarily affirmed, -- U. S. -- (1986). 
See also Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d 1140 
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The Court characterizes Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 
F. 2d 760, 766 (~80), summarily aff'd, 454 U. S. 801 
(1981), as holding that ERISA pre-empted Hawaii's health 
care statute because it impaired employers' ability to "struc-
tur[e] [their] administrative practices according to a set of 
uniform guidelines." Ante, at--. But that case involved 
more than administrative uniformity. Indeed, in Agsalud, 
the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the argument that 
ERISA was concerned only with the administration of bene-
fit plans, not state statutes which require employers to pro-
vide particular employee benefits: "Appellants in the district 
court argued that since ERISA was concerned primarily with 
the administration of benefit plans, its provisions were not in-
tended to prevent the operation of laws like the Hawaii Act 
pertaining principally to benefits rather than administration. 
There is, however, nothing in the statute to support such a 
distinction between the state laws relating to benefits as op-
posed to administration." Id., at 765. The Ninth Circuit 
held that the Hawaii Act "directly and expressly regulates 
employers and the type of benefits they provide employees. 
It must 'relate to' employee benefit plans within the meaning 
of of ERISA's broad pre-emption provision .... " Id., at 
766. Representatives of the State of Hawaii appealed to this 
Court, No. 80-1841, claiming, inter alia, that the State's po-
lice power permits it to require employers to provide certain 
employee benefits, and that Hawaii's statute "in no way con-
flicts with any substantive provision of ERISA, since that 
statute requires no benefits at all." Juris. Statement 7. We 
disagreed and summarily affirmed. 454 U. S. 801 (1981). 
The Court's "administrative-scheme" rationale provides 
states with a means of circumventing congressional intent, 
clearly expressed in§ 1144, to pre-empt all state laws that re-
late to employee benefit plans. For that reason, dissent. · 
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Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1381 
(ERISA), or the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§§ 157-158 (NLRA). The statute was upheld by the Maine 
Superior Court, Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982), 
and by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 510 A. 2d 1054 
(1986). We granted certioriari, -- U. S. -- (1986), and 
now affirm. 
I 
In 1972, Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort Halifax or 
Company) purchased a poultry packaging and processing 
plant that had operated in Winslow, Maine for almost two 
decades. The Company continued to operate the plant for 
almost another decade, until, on May 23, 1981, it discontin-
ued operations at the plant and laid off all its employees ex-
cept several maintenance and clerical workers. At the time 
of closing, over 100 employees were on the payroll. Forty-
five had worked in the plant for over 10 years, 19 for over 20 
years, and two for 29 years. Plaintiff's Supplementary Re-
sponse to Employee List, Exhibit A (June 3, 1983). Follow-
ing the closing, the Company met with State officials and 
with representatives of Local 385 of the Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, which repre-
sented many of the employees who had worked in the plant. 
While Fort Halifax initially suggested that reopening the 
plant might be feasible if the union agreed to certain conces-
sions in the form of amendments to the collective bargaining 
agreement, ultimately the Company decided against resum-
ing operations and to close the plant. 
On October 30, 1981, eleven employees filed suit in Supe-
rior Court seeking severance pay pursuant to 26 M. R. S. A. 
§ 625-B (1986 Supp.). This statute, note 1, ·supra, provides 
that any employer that terminates operations at a plant with 
100 or more employees, or relocates those operations more 
than 100 miles away, must provide one week's pay for each 
year of employment to all employees who have worked in the 
plant at least three years. The employer has no such liabil-
l" • •· 
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ity if the employee accepts employment at the new location, 
or if the employee is covered by a contract that deals with the 
issue of severance pay. I d., at § 625-B(2)-(3). Under au-
thority granted by the statute, the Maine Director of the Bu-
reau of Labor Standards also commenced an action to enforce 
the provisions of the state law, which action superceded the 
suit filed by the employees. 2 
The Superior Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, granted the Director's motion, holding that Fort 
Halifax is liable for severance pay under the statute. Civ. 
Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982). The Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed. 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986r.-Thecourt -- -~- -, . rejected the Company's contention that the plant-closing 
statute was preempted by ERISA, h~ding that~~re­
empted only benefit plans crea~e~ ~y~s or employee 
organizat~059:'- lfooserved tFlat .. the severance 
r~~bility in this case results from the operation of the 
~a rather than from the operation of an employer-
created benefit plan. Ibid . Therefore, reasoned the court, 
"[i]nasmuch as § 625-B does not implicate a plan created by 
an employer or employee organization, it cannot be said to be 
preempted by ERISA." Ibid. The court also rejected the 
argument that the state provision was preempted by the 
NLRA because it regulated conduct covered by either §§ 7 or 
8 of that statute. It found that the Maine statute applies 
equally to union and nonunion employees, and reflects "the 
state's substantial interest in protecting Maine citizens from 
2 Section 625-B(5) of the Maine statute provides in relevant part: 
"5. Suits by the director. The director is authorized to supervise the pay-
ment of the unpaid severance pay owing to any employee under this sec-
tion. The director may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion to recover the amount of any unpaid severance pay. The right 
provided by subsection 4 to bring an action by or on behalf of any em-
ployee, and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action, 
shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the director in an action 
under this subsection, unless the action is dismissed without prejudice by 
the director . . . " 
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the economic dislocation that accompanies la~nt 
cl<@_ngs." I d., at 1062. As a result, the court found that 
eligible employees were entitled to severance pay due to the 
closure of the plant at Winslow. 3 
We hold that the Maine statute is not preempted by 
ERISA, not for the reason offer db the Maine Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, but because the statute neither establishes,_por 
requires an employer to maintain, an employee welfare bene-
fit "g@_n" un er t iaflecreraiStatute. 4 We hold further that 
the Marne la~d by the NLRA, since it estab-
lishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon 
the collective bargaining process. As a result, we affirm the 
judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the 
Maine statute is not preempted by either ERISA or the 
NLRA. 
II 
Appellant's basic argument is that any state law pertaining 
to a type of employee benefit listed in ERISA necessarily 
regulates an employee benefit plan, and therefore must be 
preempted. Because severance benefits are included in 
ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1)(B), appellant argues that 
ERISA preempts the Maine statute. 5 In effect, appellant 
3 Ninety-three employees of the plant are eligible for lump-sum pay-
ments ranging from $490 to $11,500. The total amount due is about 
$256,600. Affidavit of Xavier J. Dietrich, Exhibit A (August 13, 1984). 
'Because we hold that the obligation created by the Maine statute does 
not involve a plan, we do not address the State's alternative argument 
that, even if the law does establish a plan, it is not preempted by virtue of 
the exemption for plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying 
with applicable .. . unemployment compensation laws." 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1003(b)(3). 
6 Section 1002(1)(B) defines an employee welfare benefit plan as a plan 
that pays, inter alia, benefits described in 29 U. S. C. § 186(c). The latter 
section includes, inter alia, money paid by an employer to a trust fund to 
pay for severance benefits. Section 1002(1)(B) has been construed to in-
clude severance benefits paid out of general assets, as well as out of a trust 
fund. See Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d 1140 (CA4 1985), 
aff'd mem.,- U. S.- (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 765 
86-341-0PINION 
FORT HAL IF AX PACKING CO. v. COYNE 5 
argues that ERISA forecloses virtually all state legislation 
regarding employee benefits. This contention fails, how-
ever, in light of the plain language of ERISA's preemption 
provision, the underlying purpose of that provision, and the 
overall objectives of ERISA itself. 
A 
The first answer to appellant's argument is found in the~ 
pre.ss l®gug~ute. ERISA's preemption provi-
sion does not refer to state laws relating to "employee bene-
fits", but to state laws relating to "employee benefit plans": 
' "the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereaf-
ter relate to any employee b ne t plan aescribed in 
§ 1003(a) of this title an not exempt under § 1003(b) of 
this title." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added). 
We have held that the words "relate to" should be construed 
expansively: "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in 
the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or 
reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U. S. 
85, 97 (1983). Nothing in our case law, however, supports 
appellant's position that the word "plan" should in effect be 
read out of the statute. Indeed, Shaw itself speaks of a state 
law's connection with or reference to a plan. Ibid. The 
words "benefit" and "plan" are used separately throughout 
ERISA, -and' nowhere Tilthe statute are they treated as the 
equivalent of one ano er. 1v e as1c difference be-
twe~plan," Congress' choice of language 
is significant in its preemption of only the latter. 
Thus, as a first matter, the language of the ERISA 
presents a formidable obstacle to appellant's argument. The 
reason for Congress' decision to legislate with respect to 
F. 2d 320 (CA21985), aff'd mem.,- U. S.- (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 754 F. 2d 1499 (CA9 1985); 29 CFR § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1986). See 
also discussion, infra, at-. 
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plans rather than to benefits becomes plain upon examination 
of the purpose of both the preemption section and the regula-
tory scheme as a whole. 
B 
The second answer to appellant's argument is that preemp-
tion of the Maine statute would not further the purpose of 
ERI~eemption. In anaiYZiJ1gWhetilerERfSA's pre-
emption seCtiOn is applicable to the Maine law, "as in any pre-
emption analysis, 'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate 
touchstone."' Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 747 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)). Attention to pur-
pose is particularly necessary in this case because the terms 
"employee benefit plan" and "plan" are defined only tauto-
logically in the statute, each being described as "an employee 
welfare benefit plan or emplo ee ension benefit plan or a 
plan wnich is ot an em oyee welfare benefit p an and an 
employee pension bene t p an.' 9 . . C. § 1002(3). 
Statements by ERISA's sponsors in the House and Senate 
clearly disclose the problem that the preemption provision 
was intended to address. In the House, Representative 
Dent stated that "with the preemption of the field [of em-
ployee benefit plans], we round out the protection afforded 
participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and in-
consistent State and local regulation." 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 
(1974). Similarly, Senator Williams declared, "It should be 
stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, 
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference 
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regu-
lations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsist-
ent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans." 
I d., at 29933. 
These statements reflect recognition of the administrative 
realities of employee benefit plans. An employer that makes 
a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits under-
takes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility 
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of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disburse-
ments, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit pay-
ments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply 
with applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient 
way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform 
administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard pro-
cedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of 
benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a 
benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in 
differing states. A plan would be required to keep certain 
records in some states but not in others; to make certain 
benefits available in some states but not in others; to process 
claims in a certain way in some states but not in others; and 
to comply with certain fiduciary standards in some states but 
not in others. 
We have not hesitated to enforce ERISA's preemption pro-
vision where State law created the prospect that an employ-
er's administrative scheme would be subject to conflicting re-
quirements. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 
U. S. 504 (1981), for instance, we ~ruck down a New Jersey 
statute that prohibited offsetting worker compensation pay-
ments against pension benefits. Since such a practice is per-
missible under federal law and the law of other States, the 
effect of the statute was to force the employer either to struc-
ture all its benefit payments in accordance with New Jersey 
law, or to adopt different payment formulae for employees in-
side and outside the State. The employer therefore was re-
quired to accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in de-
vising and operating a system for processing claims and 
paying benefits-precisely the burden that ERISA preemp-
tion was intended to avoid. 
This point was emphasized in Shaw, supra, where we said 
with respect to another form of State regulation, "[o]bligat-
ing the employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting 
requirements of particular state fair employment laws . . . 
would make administration of a nationwide plan more diffi-
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cult." 463 U. S., at 105 n. 25. Such a situation would 
produce considerable inefficiencies, which the employer 
might choose to offset by lowering benefit levels. As the 
Court in Shaw indicated, "ERISA's comprehensive preemp-
tion of state law was meant to minimize this sort of interfer-
ence with the administration of employee benefit plans," 
ibid., so that employers would not have to "administer their 
plans differently in each State in which they have employ-
ees." ld., at 105 (footnote omitted). 
This concern about the effect of state regulation on the ad-
ministration of benefit programs is reflected in Shaw's hold-
ing that only disability programs administered separately 
from other benefit plans fall within ERISA's preemption ex-
emption for plans maintained "for the purpose of complying 
with disability insurance laws." 29 U. S. C. 
§ 1003(b)(3). To permit the exemption to apply to disability 
benefits paid under a multibenefit plan was held to be incon-
sistent with the purpose of ERISA's preemption provision: 
"An employer with employees in several States would 
find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern 
of regulation in each State, depending on what benefits 
the State mandated under disability, workmen's com-
pensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The 
administrative impracticality of permitting mutually ex-
clusive pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a 
plan is apparent." ld., at 107-108. 
It is thus clear that ERISA's preemption provision was 
prompted by recognition that enlpioyers esta6Iishing and 
maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of 
coordinating complex administrative activities. A patch-
work scheme ofregulatronwou1d introauce considerable in-
efficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead 
those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and 
those without such plans to refrain from adopting them. 
Preemption ensures that the adminstrative practices of a 
benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regula-
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tions. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. 12 (1973) ("[A] fiduciary standard embodied in Federal 
legislation is considered desirable because it will bring a 
measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the 
same set of facts may differ from state to state"). 
Awareness of the purposes of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion makes clear that the Maine statute in no way raises the 
types of concerns that prompted preemption. Congress in-
tended preemption to afford employers the advantages of a 
uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a sin-
gle set of regulations. This concern only arises, however, 
with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires 
an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's 
obligation. It is for this reason that Congress preempted 
state laws relating to plans, rather than simply to benefits. 
Only a plan embodies a set of administrative practices vulner-
able to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork 
scheme of regulation. 
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an em-
plo~amJam, an e.!!lp oyee enefit plan~ Tfie require-
ment ora one-lime lump-sum paymenttflggered by a single 
event requires no administrative scheme whatsoever to meet 
the employer's obligation. The employer assumes no 
responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, and thus 
faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a need for 
financial coordination and control. Rather, the employer's 
obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contin-
gency that may never materialize. The employer may well 
never have to pay the severance benefits. To the extent that 
the obligation to do so arises, satisfaction of that duty in-
volves only making a single set of payments to employees at 
the time the plant closes. To do little more than write a 
check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan. 6 
6 In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt from preemption certain 
provisions of the Hawaii Act in place before the enactment of ERISA, 
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-1 through 393-51 (1976 and 1984 Supp.). 29 
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Once this single event is over, the employer has no further 
responsibility. The theoretical possibility of a one-time ob-
ligation in the future simply creates no need for an ongoing 
administrative program for processing claims and paying 
benefits. 
This point is underscored by comparing the consequences 
of the Maine statute with those produced by a state statute 
requiring the establishment of a benefit plan. In Standard 
Oil of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), aff'd 
mem., 454 U. S. 801 (1981), for instance, Hawaii had re-
quired that employers provide employees with a comprehen-
sive health care plan. The Hawaii law was struck down, for 
it posed two types of problems. 7 First, the employer in that 
case already had in place a health care plan governed by 
ERISA, which did not comply in all respects with the Hawaii 
Act. If the employer sought to achieve administrative ef-
ficiencies by integrating the Hawaii plan into its existing 
plan, different components of its single plan would be subject 
to different requirements. If it established a separate plan 
to administer the program directed by Hawaii, it would lose 
the benefits of maintaining a single administrative scheme. 
Second, if Hawaii could demand the operation of a particular 
benefit plan, so could other states, which would require that 
the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs. 
Agsalud thus illustrates that whether a State requires an ex-
isting plan to pay certain benefits, or whether it requires the 
establishment of a separate plan where none existed before, 
the problem is the same. Faced with the difficulty or impos-
U. S. C. § 1144(b)(5). The amendment did not exempt from preemption 
those portions of the Jaw dealing with reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary 
requirements. 
'See Martori Bros . Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F. 2d 1349, 
1358, amended on other grounds, 791 F. 2d 799 (CA9), cert . denied, -
U. S. -,- (1986) ("It is difficult to see how the making of one-time 
Jump sum payments could constitute the establishment of a plan"). Cf. 
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F. 2d 1367, 1373 (CAll 1982) ("A decision to 
extend benefits is not the establishment of a plan or program"). 
86-341-0PINION 
FORT HALIFAX PACKING CO. v. COYNE 11 
sibility of structuring administrative practices according to a 
set of uniform guidelines, an employer may decide to reduce 
benefits or simply not to pay them at all. 8 
By contrast, the Maine law does not put the employer to 
the choice of either: (1) integrating a state-mandated ongoing 
benefit plan with an existing plan or (2) establishing a sepa-
rate plan to process and pay benefits under the plan required 
by the State. This is because there is no State-mandated 
benefit plan to administer. In this case, for instance, Fort 
Halifax found no need to respond to passage of the Maine 
statute by setting up an administrative scheme to meet its 
contingent statutory obligation, any more than it would find 
it necessary to set up an ongoing scheme to deal with the ob-
ligations it might face in the event that some day it might go 
bankrupt. The company makes no contention that its statu-
tory duty has in any way hindered its ability to operate its 
retirement plan in uniform fashion, a plan that pays retire-
ment, death, · and permanent and total disability benefits on 
an ongoing basis. App. 40. The obligation imposed by the 
Maine statute thus differs radically in impact from a require-
ment that an employer pay ongoing benefits on a continuous 
basis. 
The Maine statute therefore creates no impediment to an 
employer's adoption of a uniform benefit administrative 
scheme. Neither the possibility of a one-time payment in 
the future, nor the act of making such a payment, in any way 
8 The dissent draws support for its position from the the court's rejection 
in Agsalud of the argument that only state laws relating to plan adminis-
tration, as opposed to~enefits, are preempted by ERISA. Post, at 
-. The court's position, however, no more than acknowledges what we 
have said in our discussion, supra: state laws requiring the payment of 
benefits also "relate to a[n] employee benefit plan" if they attempt to dic-
tate what benefits shall be paid under a plan. To hold otherwise would 
create the prospect that plan administration would be subject to differing 
requirements regarding benefit eligibility and benefit levels-precisely the 
type of conflict that ERISA's preemption provision was intended to 
prevent. 
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creates the potential for the type of conflicting regulation of 
benefit plans that ERISA preemption was intended to pre-
vent. 9 As a result, preemption of the Maine law would not 
serve the purpose for which ERISA's preemption provision 
was enacted. 
c 
The third answer to appellant's argument is that the Maine 
statute not only fails to implicate the concerns of ERISA's 
preemption provision, it fails to implicate the regulatory con-
cerns of ERISA itself. The Congressional declaration of pol-
icy, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1001, states that ERISA was en-
acted because Congress found it desirable that "disclosure be 
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the estab-
lishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit] 
plans." I d., at § 1001(a). Representative Dent, the House 
sponsor of the legislation, represented that ERISA's fidu-
ciary standards "will prevent abuses of the special respon-
sibilities borne by those dealing with plans." 120 Cong. Rec. 
29197 (1974). Senator Williams, the Senate sponsor, stated 
that these standards would safeguard employees from "such 
abuses as self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappro-
' Appellant notes that death benefits sometimes involve a one-time pay-
ment to beneficiaries, and that ERISA nonetheless defines an employee 
welfare benefit plan to include a program that pays such benefits. 29 
U. S. C. § 1002(1). Thus, it contends, the fact that the Maine statute re-
quires a single payment does not mean that the statute does not establish a 
plan. This argument, however, misunderstands what it is that makes a 
plan a plan. While death benefits may represent a one-time payment from 
the perspective of the beneficiaries, the employer clearly foresees the need 
to make regular payments to survivors on an ongoing basis. The ongoing, 
predictable nature of this obligation therefore creates the need for an ad-
ministrative scheme to process claims and pay out benefits , whether those 
benefits are received by beneficiaries in a lump sum or on a periodic basis. 
This is borne out by the fact that death benefits are included in appellant's 
retirement plan, with instructions on how eligibility is to be determined, 
benefit levels calculated, and disbursements made. App. 54-56. By con-
trast, appellant's statutory obligation did not prompt the establishment of 
any payment program, since there were no ongoing benefits to be paid. 
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priation of plan funds." ld., at 29932 (1974). The focus of 
the statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit 
plans-which presumes that some type of administrative ac-
tivity is taking place. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1785, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 46 ("In electing deliberately to preclude state 
authority over these plans, Congress acted to insure uniform-
ity of regulation with respect to their activities'); 120 Cong. 
Rec. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent) (disclosure and re-
porting requirements "will enable both participants and the 
Federal Government to monitor the plans' operations") (em-
phasis added); id., at 29935 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits) 
(disclosure meant to provide employees information "cover-
ing in detail the fiscal operations of their plan") (emphasis 
added). 
The foregoing makes clear both why ERISA is concerned 
with regulating benefit "plans," and why the Maine statute 
does not establish one. Only "plans" involve administrative 
activity potentially subject to employer abuse. The obliga-
tion imposed by Maine generates no such activity. There is 
no occasion to determine whether a "plan" is "operated" in 
the interest of its beneficiaries, because nothing is "oper-
ated." No financial transactions take place that would be 
listed in an annual report, and no further information regard-
ing the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed be-
cause the statute itself makes these terms clear. It would 
make no sense for preemption to clear the way for exclusive 
federal regulation, for there would be nothing to regulate. 
Under such circumstances, preemption would in no way 
serve the overall purpose of ERISA. 
D 
Appellant contends that failure to preempt the Maine law 
will create the opportunity for employers to circumvent 
ERISA's regulatory requirements by persuading a State to 
require the type of benefit plan that the employer otherwise 
would establish on its own. That may be so under the ra-
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tionale offered by the state Supreme Court, but that is not 
the rationale on which we rely today. 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rested its decision on 
the premise that ERISA only preempts state regU.lation of 
preexisting benefit plans established by the employer, and 
not state-mandated benefit plans. We agree that such an 
approach would afford employers a readily available means of 
evading ERISA's regulatory scope, thereby depriving em-
ployees of the protections of that statute. In addition, it 
would permit States to circumvent ERISA's preemption pro-
vision, by allowing them to require directly what they are 
forbidden to regulate. In contrast, our analysis of the pur-
pose of ERISA preemption makes clear why the mere fact 
that a plan is required by a State is insufficient to fend off 
preemption. The requirements imposed by a State's estab-
lishment of a benefit plan would pose a formidable barrier to 
the development of a uniform set of administrative practices. 
As Agsalud, supra, illustrates, an employer would be put to 
the choice of operating separate ongoing benefit plans or a 
single plan subject to different regulatory requirements, and 
would face the prospect that numerous other States would 
impose their own distinct requirements-a result squarely in-
consistent with the goal of ERISA preemption. 
Appellant's arguments are thus well taken insofar as they 
are addressed to the reasoning of the court below. We have 
demonstrated, supra, however, they have no force with re-
spect to a state statute that, as here, does not establish a 
plan. Such a statute generates no program activity that nor-
mally would be subject to ERISA regulation. Enforcement 
of the Maine statute presents no risk either that an employer 
will evade or that a State will dislodge otherwise applicable 
federal regulatory requirements. Nor is there any prospect 
that an employer will face difficulty in operating a unified. ad-
ministrative scheme for paying benefits. The rationale on 
which we rely thus does not create the dangers that appellant 
contends will result from upholding the Maine law. 
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Appellant also argues that its contention that the ~r­
an~bli@.tion under the Maine statute is an ERISA plan is 
supported by Holland v. BurlingtonJndusJ;;ies, 772 F. 2d 
1140 (CA4 1985), aff'd mem., =-t:J.s. -=: (1986), and Gil-
bert v. Burlington Industries, 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), aff'd 
mem., -- U. S. -- (1986). We disagree. Those cases 
II "''-. 
hold that a plan that pa s seve ance benefits out of general 
a_§s~s is an ERISA: p an. That holding 1s complete y con-
sistent with our 'a"'narysis above. There was no question in 
the Burlington cases, as there is in this case, whether the 
employer had a "plan"; 10 there was a "plan" and the only issue 
was whether the type of benefits paid by that plan are among 
those covered by ERISA. The pr~cise question w~ simply 
whet~ts paid by a plan out of general as-
sets, rather than out of a trust fund, should be regarded as 
employee welfare benefits under 29 U. S. C. § 1002. 11 
The courts' conclusion that they should be so regarded took 
into account ERISA's central focus on administrative integ-
rity: if an employer has an administrative scheme for paying 
benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of 
the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general as-
sets. Some severence benefit obligations by their nature ne-
cessitate an ongoing administrative scheme, but others do 
10 The employer had made a commitment to pay severance benefits to em-
ployees as each person left employment. This commitment created the 
need for ~to pay these benefits on an ongoing 
basis, and the company had distributed both a Policy Manual and Employ-
ees' Handbook that provided details on matters such as eligibility, benefit 
levels, and payment schedules. 772 F. 2d, at 1143-1144 and n. 1; 765 F. 
2d, at 323. The fact that the employer had not complied with the require-
ments of ERISA in operating this scheme therefore does not, as the dis-
sent contends, post, at-, mean that no such program for paying bene-
fits was in existence. 
"The question arose because§ 1002(1)(B) provides that an employee wel-
fare benefit plan includes a plan that provides benefits described in 29 
U. S. C. § 186(c). The latter section lists, inter alia, money paid by an 
employer to a trust fund for severance benefits. 
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not. Those that do not, such as the obligation imposed in 
this case, simply do not involve a state law that "relate[s] to" 
an employee benefit "plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). 12 The 
Burlington cases therefore do not support appellant's 
argument. 
E 
ERISA preemption analysis "must be guided by respect 
for the separate spheres of governmental authority pre-
served in our federalist system." Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 522 (1981). The argument 
that ERISA preempts state laws relating to certain em-
ployee benefits, rather than to employee benefit plans, is re-
futed by the express language of the statute, the purposes of 
the preemption provision, and the regulatory focus of ERISA 
as a whole. If a State creates no prospect of conflict with a 
federal statute, there is no warrant for disabling it from at-
tempting to address uniquely local social and economic prob-
lems. 13 Since the Maine severance payment statute raises no 
danger of such conflict, we hold that the statute is not pre-
empted by ERISA. 
12 Thus, if a State required a benefit whose regularity of payment neces-
sarily required an ongoin~ ~nefit ptogr.am, it could not evade preemption 
by the simple expedient of somehow formally characterizing the obligation 
as a one-time lump-sum payment triggered by the occurrence of a certain 
contingency. It is therefore not the case, as the dissent argues, post, at 
--, that a State could dictate the payment of numerous employee bene-
fits "by simply characterizing them as non-'administrative'. " Post, at 
13 During the decade between 1971 and 1981, a total of 107 plants were 
closed in Maine, resulting in the direct loss of 21 ,215 jobs. Leightor'i, Plant 
Closings in Maine: Law and Reality, in Plant Closing Legislation 1 (A. 
Aboud ed. , 1984). Taking into account the multiplier effects of these job 
losses on the local communities, it is estimated that the total number of 
jobs lost in Maine during this period was 49,219. ld., at 3. These losses 
were concentrated in the poorer counties of the State and in the lower 
wage industries, resulting in a significant burden on local public and pri-
vate social service agencies. ld., at 4. 
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III 
Appellant also contends that Maine's statute is preempted 
by the NLRA. In so arguing, the Company relies on the 
strand of NLRA preemption analysis that forbids States 
from "imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons 
of self-help." Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los 
Angeles,-- U. S. --,-- (1986). 14 Restriction on state 
activity in this area rests on the theory that preemption is 
necessary to further Congress' intent that "the conduct in-
volved be unregulated because left 'to be controlled by the 
free play of economic forces."' Machinists v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U. S. 132, 140 (1976) 
(quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch co., 404 U. S. 138, 144 
(1971)). 
Appellant concedes that, unlike cases in which state laws 
have been struck down under this doctrine, Maine has not di-
rectly regulated any economic activity of either of the par-
ties. See, e. g., Machinists, supra, (State enjoined union 
members from continuing to refuse to work overtime); Gar-
ner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953) (State enjoined 
union picketing). Nor has the State sought directly to force 
a party to forgo the use of one of its economic weapons. See, 
e. g., Golden State Transit, supra, (City Council conditioned 
taxicab franchise renewal on settlement of strike). None-
theless, appellant maintains that the Maine law intrudes on 
the bargaining activities of the parties because the prospect 
of a statutory obligation undercuts an employer's ability to 
withstand a union's demand for severance pay. 
This argument-that a State's establishment of minimum 
substantive labor standards undercuts collective bargain-
ing-was considered and rejected in Metropolitan Life, 
supra. That case involved a state law requiring that 
minimumum mental health benefits be provided under cer-
" The National Labor Relations Act contains no express preemption 
provision. 
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tain health insurance policies. Appellants there presented 
the same argument that appellant makes in this case: "be-
cause Congress intended to leave the choice of terms in col-
lective-bargaining agreements to the free play of economic 
forces, ... mandated-benefit laws should be preempted by 
the NLRA." 471 U. S. , at 748. The Court held, however, 
that the NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bar-
gaining process, not with the substantive terms that may 
emerge from such bargaining. "The evil Congress was ad-
dressing thus was entirely unrelated to local or federal regu-
lation establishing minimum terms of employment." I d., at 
754. Such regulation provides protections to individual 
union and non-union workers alike, and thus "neither encour-
age[s] nor discourage[s] the collective-bargaining processes 
that are the subject of the NLRA." I d., at 755. Further-
more, preemption should not be lightly inferred in this area, 
since the establishment of labor standards falls within the 
traditional police power of the State. As a result, held the 
Court, "[ w ]hen a state law establishes a minimal employment 
standard not inconsistent with the general legislative goals of 
the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of the Act." 
I d., at 757. It is true that the Maine statute gives employ-
ees something for which they otherwise might have to bar-
gain. That is true, however, with regard to any state law 
that substantively regulates employment conditions. Both 
employers and employees come to the bargaining table with 
rights under state law that form a "backdrop" for their nego-
tiations. Ibid. (quoting Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 
U. S. 223, 228 (1970) (concurring opinion)). Absent a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, for instance, state common law 
generally permits an employer to run the workplace as it 
wishes. The employer enjoys this authority without having 
to bargain for it. The parties may enter negotiations de-
signed to alter this state of affairs, but, if impasse is reached, 
the employer may rely on preexisting state law to justify its 
authority to make employment decisions; that same state law 
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defines the rights and duties of employees. Similarly, Maine 
provides that employer and employees may negotiate with 
the intention of establishing severance pay terms. If im-
passe is reached, however, preexisting state law determines 
the right of employees to a certain level of severance pay and 
the duty of the employer to provide it. Thus, the mere fact 
that a state statute pertains to matters over which the par-
ties are free to bargain cannot support a claim of preemption, 
for "there is nothing in the NLRA . . . which expressly fore-
closes all state regulatory power with respect to those issues 
... that may be the subject of collective bargaining." Ma-
lone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504-505 (1978). 
Appellant maintains that this case is distinguishable from 
Metropolitan Life. It points out that, unlike Metropolitan 
Life, the statutory obligation at issue here is optional, since it 
applies only in the absence of an agreement between em-
ployer and employees. Therefore, the Company argues, the 
Maine law cannot be regarded as establishing a genuine mini-
mum labor standard. The fact that the parties are free to 
devise their own severance pay arrangements, however, 
strengthens the case that the statute works no intrusion on 
collective bargaining. Maine has sought to balance the de-
sirability of a particular substantive labor standard against 
the right of self-determination regarding the terms and con-
ditions of employment. If a statute that permits no collec-
tive bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA preemption, see 
Metropolitan Life, surely one that permits such bargaining 
cannot be preempted. 15 
16 Appellant also contends that, unlike the statute in Metropolitan Life, 
the Maine law does not fall equally upon union and non-union employees. 
Non-union employers, it argues, are free unilaterally to escape their statu-
tory obligation by establishing severance payment levels, while unionized 
employers must engage in collective bargaining in order to achieve the 
same result. Any difference in the ease of establishing alternative sever-
ance payment obligations, however, flows not from the statute, but from 
the basic fact that a non-union employer is freer to set employment terms 
than is a unionized employer. 
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We therefore find that Maine's severance payment law is 
"a valid and unexceptional exercise of the [State's] police 
power." Metropolitan Life, supra, at 758. Since "Congress 
developed the framework for self-organization and collective 
bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law 
promoting public health and safety," ibid., the Maine statute 
is not preempted by the NLRA. 16 
IV 
We hold that the Maine severance pay statute is not pre-
empted by ERISA, since it does not "relate to any employee 
benefit plan" under that statute. 29 U. S. C.§ 1144(a). We 
hold further that the law is not preempted by the NLRA, 
since its establishment of a minimum labor standard does not 
impermissibly intrude upon the collective bargaining process. 
The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is 
therefore 
Affirmed. 
16 We also find no support for an argument of preemption under the rule 
established in San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 v. 236 (1959), 
since the Maine statute does not purport to regulate any conduct subject to 
regulation by the National Labor Relations Board. See Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts , 471 U. S. 724, 748-749 (1985). 
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